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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION.
How to determine the relation between religion and
state is one of main themes in the modern constitutional
law. Although the free exercise of religion is protected
by most of the constitutional laws in the world, the
relation among them differs even in the Western
countries.'^ The United Kingdom, for instance, establishes
its state church (the Church of England) , while in Germany
churches are given the official status to serve "an
important role in the nation's public life."^ In the
United States, as well as in France and Japan, the
Constitution prohibits government from establishing a
state church or religion.'^
In the type of the United States, the separation
between religion and state would run afoul of the free
All translations from Japanese to English are the
author's unless otherwise indicated.
"" See Koichi Yokota, The Separation of Religion and
State, in Japanese Constitutional Law 2 05 (Percy R. Luney, Jr.
& Kazuyuki Takahashi eds
.
, 1993).
^ Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the
Federal Republic of Germany 445 (198 9) .
^ See U.S. Const, amend. I; Law of Dec. 9, 1905
(France), C.adm. 787 (1994); Kenpo (Japan), art. 20, para.
exercise of religion,'' To avoid this conflict, some
commentators suggested several possible results; that is,
to prefer either the free exercise of religion, or the
separation of religion and state to the other. ^ The
concept of religious accommodation is one of those
results, which the Supreme Court of the United States has
recognized.^ According to Professor Michael W. McConnell,
who is the strongest advocate of accommodation,
" [a] ccommodation refers to government laws or policies
that have the purpose and effect of removing a burden on,
or facilitating the exercise of, a person' s or an
institution's religion."'' In this view, the main parts of
religious freedom are "the autonomy of the religious
institutions, individual choice in matters of religion.
"^ See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-669
(1970); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion,
1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1 (" [S] ometimes separation enhances
religious liberty and sometimes separation diminishes
it.") .
^ See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone et al.. Constitutional Law
1613 (3d ed. 1996); Gerald Gunther & Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Constitutional Law 14 67 (13th ed. 1997) .
^ Walz V. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)
("there is room for play in the joints productive of a
benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise
to exist without sponsorship and without interference.")
.
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion:
An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 685, 686 (1992); see also id. at 717-718 ("This kind
of ^favoritism toward religion,' however, is inherent in
the very text of the First Amendment. [If] the
Establishment Clause prohibits the advancement of
religion, and if extending special constitutional
protection to free exercise advances religion, then the
Religion Clauses are contradictory.").
3and the freedom to put a chosen faith (if any) into
practice."^ Moreover, the separation of religion and
state is seen in this view as "subsidiary, instrumental,
values in ... religious liberty."^ Although this position
could be against the strict separation of religion and
state, it would not sacrifice people's religious freedom.
What is the difference between accommodating religion
and favoring religion? One commentator explains it in
particularly clear fashion.
[A] "religious purpose" is not the same
as a "purpose of accommodating religious
beliefs." If someone does something for a
"religious purpose," then ... she does it
because her religious beliefs encourage her
to do it and because she thinks that those
beliefs are valid. Thus, one goes to church
or says grace before meals for a religious
purpose. Likewise, when a legislature
requires schoolchildren to read the Bible, it
generally does so for a religious purpose:
not simply because it thinks that class
discipline will benefit from the practice,
but also ... because it thinks that
Christianity is the true religion and that
children should learn about it for the
betterment of their souls. Yet any given
accommodation of religion may not have a
religious purpose. If someone invites ten
people over to dinner and two of them are
Hindu, he will probably go out of his way to
stock his refrigerator with something besides
hamburgers and hot dogs. Yet he does this
regardless of, not because of, his own
McConnell, supra note 4, at 1 (footnote omitted)
.
^ Id. at 2.
Note that the Japanese Supreme Court also recognizes
the separation of religion and state as an institutional
guarantee of religious liberty, see infra text
accompanying note 230.
religious beliefs. He does it not because he
thinks that his Hindu friends' religious
beliefs are true, but simply because
accommodating their religious scruples is a
respectful thing to do. [Accommodating
religious believers] simply reflects the
government's secular respect for their right
to choose their way of life.'^^
I believe that the value of free exercise of religion
surpasses the value of the separation of religion and
state. However, facilitating the religious value should
not exceed the limit of the Religious Clause. ^"^
Furthermore, government has discretion whether to take
alternative burden on religious beneficiaries to assure
not to give religion an excessive favor over non-religion.
In this thesis, I discuss the extent to which
government can afford to give accommodation within the
limits of the Establishment Clause. In Chapter II, I
review the theory of the permissible accommodation
referred in the Supreme Court of the United States. In
Chapter III, I examine scholarly debates on the
accommodation. Then, I discuss German and Japanese law of
the accommodation in Chapter IV. There, those cases
suggest the possibility of alternative burdens on
religious believers. The alternative burdens are
"^ Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Note, The Free Exercise
Boundaries of Permissible Accommodation Under the
Establishment Clause, 99 Yale L.J. 1127, 1135-1136 (1990)
(footnote omitted)
.
^^ The Constitution of the United States provides
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof ... ." U.S. Const, amend. I. The former is
5considered the price of the accommodation. I conclude
that government has authority to determine whether to
confer accommodation to religion, and discretion to take
alternative burden, which is non-religious burden imposed
by government to those who receive accommodating benefits.
Those government decisions are subject to courts that
examine whether the decisions violate the Establishment
Clause
.
called the Establishment Clause, and the latter is the
Free Exercise Clause.
CHAPTER II. ACCOMMODATION TO RELIGION IN THE SUPREME
COURT.
As the U.S. Supreme Court stated, "[the] two Religion
Clauses ... are cast in absolute terms, and either of
[them] , if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to
clash with the other. "'"^ This might be an inevitable
collision. As described above, commentators have
suggested several solutions to reconcile it.''"^
Accommodation to religion, which stresses the value of the
free exercise of religion preference over non-
establishment value, '^'^ is useful to resolve the conflict,
and is what the Supreme Court has always relied on cases
12
13
14
Walz V. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-669 (1970)
See supra text accompanying note 5,
See, e.g.. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 812
(1983) (Brenann, J., dissenting) ("[0]ur cases recognize
that, in one important respect, the Constitution is not
neutral on the subject of religion: Under the Free
Exercise Clause, religiously motivated claims of
conscience may give rise to constitutional rights that
other strongly-held beliefs do not."); Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 83 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("The solution to the conflict between the
Religion Clauses lies ... in identifying workable limits to
the government's license to promote the free exercise of
religion. ")
.
it needs to confront the conflict. ^^ The Court has surely
recognized the need of religious accommodations . "
Professor Tribe indicates that there are three types
of accommodation: required, permissible, and forbidden . '^
The required accommodation is that the Free Exercise
Clause requires government to make some accommodations to
religious believers, ^^ such as excusing them from
compulsory program of public education, ^^ or including in
unemployment compensation those who were fired because of
their belief. ^° The permissible accommodation is that the
Establishment Clause permits government to accommodate
religion while the Free Exercise Clause does not require
doing so.^"^ This involves cases such as building a church
in a public university premise, allowing drug consumption
^^ See infra text accompanying notes 71-106.
^^ Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S.
136, 144-145 (1987) ("This Court has long recognized that
the government may (and sometimes must) accommodate
religious practices and that it may do so without
violating the Establishment Clause.").
''' See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 14-
5, at 1169 (2d ed. 1988) .
"^ Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 743, 751 (1992) .
^^ See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
^° See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963);
Thomas v. Review Bd
.
, 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Com'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
^^ Lupu, supra note 18, at 751.
for religious sacraments, ^^ or exempting conscientious
objectors from obligatory military services. ^^ The
forbidden accommodation is what the Establishment Clause
prohibits government to do, such as a direct subsidy to
religion, or tax exemption only for religion. ^^
In this chapter, I examine permissible accommodation
cases in the Supreme Court.
A. Emergence of Accommodation in the Court.
Zorach v. Clauson^^ is the case that "[t]he concept
of accommodation ... first appeared in a Supreme Court
opinion. "^^ This was the case with respect to the
constitutionality of a "released time" program in public
schools that allowed students to attend religious classes
held outside the school premises during school day.
Upholding the program. Justice Douglas said for the Court
that the separation of religion and state should not be a
^^ See e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1992); Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 13-3402 (B) ( 1) - (3) (1989); Colo. Rev. Stat. §
12-22-317(3) (1985); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-4116 (c) ( 8
)
(1985); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-31-6 (D) (Supp.1989); Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-3 (3) (1986) .
^"^ With respect to the history of the religious
exemption from military service, see generally United
States V. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 632-633 (1931) (Hughes,
C.J., dissenting); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163,
169-173 (1965) . See also Kommers, supra note 2, 462-466
(German conscientious objection statutes).
^^ See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1
1989'
" 343 U.S. 306 (1952)
^^ McConnell, supra note 4, at 4
rigorous one . ^^ Rather, "[w]hen the state encourages
religious instruction or cooperates with religious
authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to
sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions.
For it then respects the religious nature of our people
and accommodates the public service to their spiritual
needs. "2^
In Sherbert v. Verner,^^ the Court denied government
exclusion from unemployment compensation of a religious
believer who was fired because of her religious
observance. It changed its course toward the Free
Exercise Clause"^° to mandate government to make some
^^ Zorach, 343 U.S. at 312 (''The First Amendment ...
does not say that in every and all respects there shall be
a separation of Church and State. Rather, it studiously
defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there
shall be no concert or union or dependency one on the
other. That is the common sense of the matter. Otherwise
the state and religion would be aliens to each other -
hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly.").
28
29
30
Id. at 313-314.
374 U.S. 398 (1963
See, e.g., Reynolds v. United Sates, 98 U.S. 145
(1878); Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586
(1940) .
In these cases, the Court suggested that the free
exercise claim could not be superior to the government
interest to keep general applicability of the law which
maintained the social order. See also Employment Div., v
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (''[T]he right of free
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation
to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes).'" (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252, 263 n. 3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment) ) )
.
10
exemptions on generally applicable laws against religious
claims. Three Justices indicated their approval for
permissible legislative accommodation. Saying that when
there was conflict between the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause should
yield its way to the Free Exercise Clause, ^^ Justice
Stewart stated in his concurrence that "our Constitution
commands the positive protection by government of
religious Freedom - not only for a minority, however small
- not only for the majority, however large - but for each
of us.""^^ Justice Harlan also showed his affirmative
position for permissible accommodation in his dissent,
which Justice White joined. ^"^
Justice Brennan suggested his acceptance of
permissible accommodation in School Dist. of Abington v.
^•^ Id. at 415 (Stewart, J., concurring in the
judgment)
.
^^ Id. at 416 (Stewart, J., concurring in the
judgment) (emphasis added)
.
^^ Id. at 423 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[T]here is,
I believe, enough flexibility in the Constitution to
permit a legislative judgment accommodating [religion].");
see also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 359 n.9
(1970) ("My own conclusion, to which I still adhere, is
that [a] State could constitutionally create exceptions to
its program to accommodate religious scruples. That
suggestion must, however, be qualified by the observation
that any such exception in order to satisfy the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, would have to
be sufficiently broad to be religiously neutral.").
11
Schempp,^^ where the Court invalidated Bible reading in
public schools. Six categories of cases "to be treated
distinctly with regard to the level of accommodation
permissible under the Constitution"^^ were offered by him.
The first category is the conflict between the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, where
government's strict religious separation policy might
infringe individual's right of the free exercise. ^^
Secondly, Justice Brennan discussed religious exercises in
legislative bodies, and said that since the member of
legislature are all matured, this sort of religious
exercise does not cause any Establishment Clause
concern. ^^ Third, the Justice permitted non-devotional
use of religious matters in the public schools, such as
referring to religion or "differences between religious
^^ 374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("[N]ot every involvement of religion in
public life violates the Establishment Clause.").
^^ Kristin M. Engstrom, Comment, Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence : the Souring of Lemon and the Search
for a New Test, 27 Pac. L.J. 121, 147 (1995) (footnote
omitted)
.
^^ Schempp, 374 U.S. at 296-299 (Brennan, J.,
concurring)
.
"^"^ Id. at 299-300 (Brennan, J., concurring).
But see Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795-796
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (" [D] isagreement with the Court
requires that I confront the fact that some 20 years ago,
in a concurring opinion in one of the cases striking down
official prayer and ceremonial Bible reading in the public
schools, I came very close to endorsing essentially the
result reached by the Court today. Nevertheless, after
much reflection, I have come to the conclusion that I was
wrong then and that the Court is wrong today." (footnote
omitted) )
.
12
sects"^^ as social and historical matters. The fourth
category is uniform tax exemptions incidentally available
to religious institutions, in which "religious
institutions simply share benefits which government makes
generally available to educational, charitable, and
eleemosynary groups ."^^ Justice Brennan regarded
religious considerations in public welfare programs as the
fifth category. There are programs in which government
could include individuals whose demands are religiously
motivated in nondiscriminatory welfare programs, such as
unemployment compensation programs. '^° The sixth category
^^ Schempp, 374 U.S. at 300 (Brennan, J.,
concurring)
.
^^ Id. at 301 (Brennan, J., concurring) . See
generally Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)
(property tax exemption); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388
(1983) (tax deduction for educational expenses).
''° Schempp, 374 U.S. at 302-303 (Brennan, J.,
concurring)
See generally Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963); Thomas v. Review Bd
.
, 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Hobble
V. Unemployment Appeals Com'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987). See
also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (religious use
in public university facilities); Witters v. Washington
Dept. of Services for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986)
(financial vocational assistance for a blind student);
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (grant program for
teenage sexuality counseling); Board of Educ . of Westside
Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990)
(religious use in public high school facilities); Lamb's
Chapel V. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508
U.S. 384 (1993) (religiously oriented use in public
school facilities); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School
Dist., 509 U.S. 1, (1993) (providing interpreter for deaf
students); Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va
.
, 115
S.Ct. 2510 (1995) (financial assistance for public
university students activities)
.
13
consisted of activities which, though religious in origin,
have ceased to have religious meaning, such as the motto
"In God We Trust" in currency, or the public display of
Christmas trees. ^^ He had recognized that the boundary of
accommodation should "accord [] with history and faithfully
reflect [] the understanding of the Founding Fathers. "^^
For Justice Brennan, denying religious accommodation
such as the refusal of "chaplains and places of worship
for prisoners and soldiers cut off by the State from all
civilian opportunities for public communion, the
withholding of draft exemptions for ministers and
conscientious objectors, or the denial of the temporary
use of an empty public building to a congregation whose
place of worship has been destroyed by fire or flood, "^^
could be hostility toward religion.''''
^^ Schempp, 374 U.S. at 303-304 (Brennan, J.,
concurring)
.
^^ Id. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also
id. at 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring)
.
Justice Brennan described what the Founders wanted to
prohibit were "those involvements of religious with
secular institutions which (a) serve the essentially
religious activities of religious institutions; (b) employ
the organs of government for essentially religious
purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means to serve
governmental ends, where secular means would suffice," Id.
at 295. See also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 681,
686-687 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
''^ Id. at 299 (Brennan, J., concurring) .
'' Id,
Nevertheless, Justice Brennan did not intend to
suggest that "government must provide chaplains or draft
exemptions, or that the courts should intercede if it
fails to do so," Id. It seems he also recognized then
14
Walz V. Tax Comm'n'^^ is another case in which the
Court mentioned accommodation. Upholding property tax
exemption policy to religious organizations as well as
educational and charitable organizations, Chief Justice
Burger said in his majority opinion that government
accommodation covered much a wider area than that mandated
by the Free Exercise Clause through courts.''^ Justice
Burger also mentioned tradition and national heritage that
could be the limit of permissible accommodation 47
In McDaniel v. Paty,^^ although the majority did not
say anything about permissible accommodation, Justice
Brennan restated his opinion with respect to it. In that
case, the Court struck down a State constitutional
provision that excluded clergymen from elected public
office. In his concurring opinion. Justice Brennan
reiterated his reliance on 7\merican history, tradition,
and heritage that would be the limit of permissible
accommodation.''^ There, he perceived that the structure
that it was a government's discretion to decide whether it
needed to make an exemption for religious believers.
"^ 397 U.S. 664, (1970)
.
^^ Id. at 673 ("The limits of permissible state
accommodation to religion are by no means co-extensive
with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise
Clause.")
.
'' Id.
"^ 435 U.S. 618 (1978)
.
^^ Id. at 638 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("[T]he Court's decisions have indicated that
the limits of permissible governmental action with respect
to religion under the Establishment Clause must reflect an
15
of the Religious Clauses allows government "to take
religion into account when necessary to further secular
purposes unrelated to the advancement of religion, and to
exempt, when possible, from generally applicable
governmental regulation individuals whose religious
beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be
infringed, or to create without state involvement an
atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may
flourish. "^°
Since the 1980s, the Court has taken further steps to
allow permissible government accommodation. In Lynch v.
Donnelly^^ where the Court validated a display of the
nativity scene (creche) owned by local government in a
park with other Christmas decorations. Chief Justice
Burger said for the majority: "[n]or does the Constitution
require complete separation of church and state; it
affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely
tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward
any."^^ Justice Burger believed that to permit this
religious display in holiday seasons was an accommodation
appropriate accommodation of our heritage as a religious
people whose freedom to develop and preach religious ideas
and practices is protected by the Free Exercise Clause."
(footnote omitted) )
.
^° Id. at 639 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment)
.
^^ 465 U.S. 668 (1984)
^^ Id. at 673 (citation omitted!
16
to religion justified by history and longstanding
traditions . ^^
Justice Brennan later outlined his new approach
toward his six categories of government accommodation in
School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp.^^ In refining his
theory, Justice Brennan said that there are three
principles derived from the Court's precedents that permit
government to acknowledge religion under the Establishment
Clause. ^^ First, government "may, consistently with the
" Id. at 675-677 ("Our history is replete with
official references to the value and invocation of Divine
guidance in deliberations and pronouncements of the
Founding Fathers and contemporary leaders. [Our] history
is pervaded by expressions of religious beliefs ....
Equally pervasive is the evidence of accommodation of all
faiths and all forms of religious expression, and
hostility toward none."); see also id. at 686 ("It would
be ironic, however, if the inclusion of a single symbol of
a particular historic religious event, as part of a
celebration acknowledged in the Western World for 20
centuries, and in this country by the people, by the
Executive Branch, by the Congress, and the courts for two
centuries, would so 'taint' the City's exhibit as to
render it violative of the Establishment Clause. To
forbid the use of this one passive symbol - the creche -
at the very time people are taking note of the season with
Christmas hymns and carols in public schools and other
public places, and while the Congress and Legislatures
open sessions with prayers by paid chaplains would be a
stilted overreaction contrary to our history and to our
holdings. If the presence of the creche in this display
violates the Establishment Clause, a host of other forms
of taking official note of Christmas, and of our religious
heritage, are equally offensive to the Constitution.").
^^ See supra text accompanying notes 35-41.
^^ Lynch, 465 U.S. at 715 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[I]t appears from our prior decisions that at least
three principles - tracing the narrow channels which
government acknowledgments must follow to satisfy the
Establishment Clause - may be identified.").
17
Establishment Clause, act to accommodate to some extent
the opportunities of individuals to practice their
religion," even though to do so is not mandated by the
Free Exercise Clause. ^^ In this principle, government has
some latitudes to decide whether or not to give
accommodation to religion beyond the Free Exercise
Clause. ^^ Second, "while a particular governmental
practice may have derived from religious motivations and
retain certain religious connotations, it is nonetheless
permissible for the government to pursue the practice when
it is continued today solely for secular reasons. "^^ To
uphold Sunday closing laws or to cerebrate Thanksgiving
Day officially may be justified in this principle. ^^
Thirdly, government may recognize ^'the religious beliefs
and practices of the American people as an aspect of our
national history and culture" in its official actions
without violating the Establishment Clause. ^° According
to Justice Brennan, if referring to religion or
acknowledging it gives solemnity to a public ceremony and
have practiced repeatedly for a long time, those practices
56
57
58
59
60
omitted)
Id (citation omitted)
.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 715-716 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation
18
would have lost religious meaning and serve some cultural
functions . ^^
In the next year, the Court held in Wallace v.
Jaffree^^ that a legislature could not amend a school
meditation law to install a word "prayer." In her
concurrence, Justice O'Connor showed her agreement to
permissible accommodation. She stated that although the
Free Exercise Clause does not require government to make
an exemption for "persons from some generally applicable
government requirements so as to permit those persons to
freely exercise their religion, "^^ it is the teaching of
the precedents that "the government in some circumstances
may voluntarily choose to exempt religious observers
without violating the Establishment Clause."^'' In so
saying. Justice O'Connor did not rely on neutrality toward
religion to solve the conflict between the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. ^^ Instead, she said,
it would be very important to identify "workable limits to
^"^ Id. at 716-717 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see
also id. at 717 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The practices
by which the government has long acknowledged religion are
therefore probably necessary to serve certain secular
functions, and that necessity, coupled with their long
history, gives those practices an essentially secular
meaning . ") .
" 472 U.S. 38 (1985) .
^^ Id. at 81 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) (citation omitted).
^^ Id. at 82 (O'Connor
judgment) (citation omitted)
.
65
judgment
64 , J., concurring in the
^^ Id. at 83 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
19
the government's license to promote the free exercise of
religion, "^^ Justice O'Connor developed her "endorsement
test"^^ to apply to permissible accommodation cases, ^^ and
argued that if government policies seem to be
accommodation by pursuing "[the] Free Exercise Clause
values when [they] lift[] a government-imposed burden on
the free exercise of religion, "^^ the Free Exercise Clause
justifies "the religious purpose of" government
1 • • 70policies
.
B. The Accommodation Argument in the Current Court.
By the middle of 1982s, the Court has begun to take
permissible accommodation issues into account.
'' Id.
^^ The endorsement test is a scrutiny for the
Establishment Clause that "examine [s] whether government's
purpose is to endorse religion and whether the statute
actually conveys a message of endorsement" in the view of
the objective observer, who must know the Religious
Clauses and background of the case. Id. at 69 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in the judgment); see also Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688-689 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)
.
^^ Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in the judgment) ("The endorsement test does not preclude
government from acknowledging religion or from taking
religion into account in making law and policy.")
.
^^ Id. at 83 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment)
.
'° Id.
20
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.'^^ was the first
modern case in which the Court dealt with the government
accommodation issue. In this case, the constitutionality
of a state law that absolutely mandated an employer to
accommodate an employee's designated Sabbath in its
working schedule was challenged. Chief Justice Burger
concluded for the Court that this obligatory requirement
over the employer to accommodate one's religious need
could not be seen as permissible government accommodation
so that it violated the Establishment Clause. In so
doing, the Court said that because "the statute takes no
account of the convenience or interests of the employer or
those of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath, "^^
"[t]his unyielding weighting in favor of Sabbath observers
over all other interests contravenes a fundamental
principle of the Religion Clauses . "'^'^ Justice O'Connor,
in her concurring opinion, tried to distinguish the
statute here from "the religious accommodation provisions
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,"''^ stating
^^ 472 U.S. 703 (1985)
'^ Id. at 709
^^ Id. at 710.
^^ Id. at 711 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
.
See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78
Stat. 241, 243 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
These provisions prescribe as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer ... to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or
21
that "[s]ince Title VII calls for reasonable rather than
absolute accommodation and extends that requirement to all
religious beliefs and practices rather than protecting
only the Sabbath observance, I believe an objective
observer would perceive it as an anti- discrimination law
rather than an endorsement of religion or a particular
religious practice. "^^
In Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos,^^ the
Court was again concerned with an accommodation statute.
It affirmed a provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964^^ which "exempts religious organizations from
privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
The term "religion" includes all aspects
of religious observance and practice, as well
as belief, unless an employer demonstrates
that he is unable to reasonably accommodate
to an employee's or prospective employee's
religious observance or practice without
undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer's business.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
^^ Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 712 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)
.
"^^ 483 U.S. 327 (1987) .
^^ The provision at issue prescribes: "[The non-
religious discrimination provision (Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964)] shall not apply ... to a religious
corporation, association, educational institution, or
society with respect to the employment of individuals of a
particular religion to perform work connected with the
carrying on by such corporation, association, educational
institution, or society of its activities." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-l (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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[an anti-discrimination provision] in employment on the
basis of religion. "^^ For the majority. Justice White
said that "there is ample room for accommodation of
religion under the Establishment Clause. "^^ The Court
perceived that "[w]here ... government acts with the proper
purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise
of religion, we see no reason to require that the
exemption comes packaged with benefits to secular
entities. "^° Furthermore, the Court stated that an
accommodation statute should not be the subject of strict
scrutiny if it passes the Lemon test.^'^ Instead, the
Court continued, it is sufficient to apply the rational-
based scrutiny that inquires into "the legitimate purpose
of alleviating significant governmental interference with
the ability of religious organizations to define and carry
out their religious missions. "^^ In her concurrence,
Justice O'Connor again proposed her "endorsement test"
over the Lemon test for the test, evaluating whether an
78
79
80
81
Amos, 483 U.S. at 329.
Id. at 338.
Id.
Id. at 339 ("In cases ... where a statute is
neutral on its face and motivated by a permissible purpose
of limiting governmental interference with the exercise of
religion, we see no justification for applying strict
scrutiny to a statute that passes the Lemon test.") .
For the Lemon test, see infra note 134.
'' Id.
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accommodation statute is permissible under the
Establishment Clause. ^"^
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock^'^ was the case the
Court struck down a State sales tax exemption law that
only applied to religious periodicals. Justice Brennan
articulated a criterion for deciding whether a statute or
a government action is permissible accommodation to
religion or impermissible preference of religion. ^^ Under
his criterion, Justice Brennan said that government can
give a benefit based on religion if it (1) "is conferred
upon a wide array of nonsectarian groups as well as
religious organizations in pursuit of some legitimate
secular end,"^^ (2) is "designed to alleviate government
intrusions that might significantly deter adherents of a
particular faith from conduct protected by the Free
Exercise Clause, "^"^ or (3) "did not, or would not, impose
substantial burdens on nonbeneficiaries while allowing
others to act according to their religious belief s."^^
This could be a test to evaluate whether statute or
government action seems as permissible accommodation. As
^^ Id, at 348 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment)
.
^^ 489 U.S. 1, 38 (1989) .
^^ Id. at 11-15 (plurality opinion) ; see also
McConnell, supra note 7, at 698-705.
^^ Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 14 (plurality opinion;
(footnote omitted)
.
^^ Id. at 18 n.8 (plurality opinion)
.
'' Id.
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one commentator has stated, this test "repudiates the
position ... that the political branches have no discretion
to institute accommodations that are not constitutionally
compelled by the Free Exercise Clause."®^ However, the
first prong of Justice Brennan's test is "not easy to
reconcile with"^° the precedents since the Court did
decide in Amos that religious accommodation should not be
"packaged with benefits to secular entities. "^^ Note also
that Justice Brennan finally dropped his reliance on the
history, tradition, and heritage of America as the limit
of permissible accommodation.
Justice Kennedy proposed his own standard to decide
the limits of permissible accommodation in County of
Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, '^^ where the
Court struck down a creche, standing alone in a courthouse
and approved a large Chanukah menorah placed outside a
government building with a Christmas tree. In his
concurring opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia joined. Justice Kennedy said that there are
two limits to permissible accommodation:
[G]overnment may not coerce anyone to
support or participate in any religion or its
^^ McConnell, supra note 7, at 709.
^° Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the
Supreme Court'': Kurland Revisited, 1989 Sup. Ct. Rev. 373,
388.
^^ Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S,
327, 338 (1987) .
^^ 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989) .
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exercise; and it may not, in the guise of
avoiding hostility or callous indifference,
give direct benefits to religion in such a
degree that it in fact "establishes a [state]
religion or religious faith, or tends to do
so.
"^3
In his noncoercive theory, Justice Kennedy relied heavily
on American history, traditions, and national heritage as
the elements to judge whether a government action seems to
violate the Establishment Clause.^''
In Lee v. Weisman,'^^ where the Court invalidated
school prayer in a graduation ceremony of a public school,
Justice Souter stated that religious accommodation must be
evaluated by government neutrality toward religion, ^^ He
^^ Id. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment
in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
^'^ See id. at 662-663 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("Noncoercive
government action within the realm of flexible
accommodation or passive acknowledgment of existing
symbols does not violate the Establishment Clause unless
it benefits religion in a way more direct and more
substantial than practices that are accepted in our
national heritage."); id. at 679 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he
principles of the Establishment Clause and our Nation'
s
historic traditions of diversity and pluralism allow
communities to make reasonable judgments respecting the
accommodation or acknowledgment of holidays with both
cultural and religious aspects.").
^^ 505 U.S. 577 (1992)
.
^^ Id. at 627-628 (Souter, J., concurring) ("That
government must remain neutral in matters of religion does
not foreclose it from ever taking religion into account.
The State may "accommodate" the free exercise of religion
by relieving people from generally applicable rules that
interfere with their religious callings. [Such]
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also emphasized that "accommodation must lift a
discernible burden on the free exercise of religion,"
and concluded that government could release religious
believers from situations in which they needed to take
''sides between God and government . "^^
Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet^^ is the case
the Court struck down an accommodation law which gave
religious believers belonging to one sect the power to
operate a school district. Justice Souter, writing for
the majority, repeatedly discussed that government could
offer accommodation to religion if it secured religious
neutrality . ^'^^ He concluded the case using his argument
for accommodation that "the statute ... fails the test of
neutrality [since] [i]t delegates a power ... to an
electorate defined by common religious belief and
practice, in a manner that fails to foreclose religious
accommodation does not necessarily signify an official
endorsement of religious observance over disbelief."
(citation omitted) )
.
^^ Id. at 629 (Souter, J., concurring)
.
^^ Id. at 628 (Souter, J., concurring); see also
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) ("[T]o
condition the availability of benefits upon this
appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal principle of
her religious faith effectively penalizes the free
exercise of her constitutional liberties.").
^^ 512 U.S. 687 (1994)
.
^°° Id. at 706-707 ("[W]hatever the limits of
permissible legislative accommodations may be, ... it is
clear that neutrality as among religions must be honored."
(citation omitted) )
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favoritism. ^"^ Justice O'Connor also agreed in her
concurring opinion that neutrality is the main element to
evaluate permissible accommodation . '^^^ Stating that the
Religious Clauses require that one's legal status not be
influenced by one's religious belief, ^°"^ she emphasized:
What makes accommodation permissible ...
is not that the government is making life
easier for some particular religious group as
such. Rather, it is that the government is
accommodating a deeply held belief.
Accommodations may thus justify treating
those who share this belief differently from
those who do not; but they do not justify
discriminations based on sect.''"^''
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy stressed that "when
the accommodation requires the government to draw
political or electoral boundaries, "'°^ it will violate the
Establishment Clause. For him, the crucial limits for the
accommodation is that "government may not use religion as
a criterion to draw political or electoral lines. "^^^
^°^ Id. at 709-710.
^°^ Id. at 714 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) ("Religious needs can be
accommodated through laws that are neutral with regard to
religion . ")
.
''' Id.
'°' Id.
"^°^ Id. at 728 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment) .
''' Id.
28
C. Analysis.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently
sustained the need for permissible accommodation. It
appears clear that "the government has some latitude to
accommodate religion beyond the requirements of the Free
Exercise Clause," though the Court has not made persuasive
arguments on the limits of permissibility . "^^^ At the
outset, it seems established law in the Court that
government may confer a benefit to religious believers as
well as secular persons based on religiously neutral
policies . "^°^ Probably, all the Justices in the Court would
agree with this sort of accommodation. "^°^ The problem is
^°'' McConnell, supra note 7, at 709; see also John E.
NowAK AND Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 12 8 8 (5th ed.
1995) ("'The Supreme Court has never explained the precise
limits that the establishment clause may place on the
ability of government to accommodate religion.")
.
^°^ See generally Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664
(1970) (property tax exemption); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981) (religious use in public university
facilities); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (tax
deduction for educational expenses); Witters v. Washington
Dept. of Services for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986)
(financial vocational assistance for a blind student);
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (grant program for
teenage sexuality counseling); Board of Educ . of Westside
Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990)
(religious use in public high school facilities); Lamb's
Chapel V. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508
U.S. 384 (1993) (religiously oriented use in public
school facilities); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School
Dist., 509 U.S. 1, (1993) (providing interpreter for deaf
students); Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va
.
, 115
S.Ct. 2510 (1995) (financial assistance for public
university student activities)
.
^°^ See e.g., Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2532 (Thomas,
J., concurring) ("[There is] one basic principle that has
enjoyed an uncharacteristic degree of consensus: The
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whether an accommodation that gives religious believers
some advantages over nonbelievers because of their
religion is permissible. In other words, can government
voluntarily offer religion special treatment in order to
implement the Free Exercise Clause? With this aspect, all
the Justices but Justice Stevens^^° approve the right of
government to make accommodations that lift burdens on the
right of the free exercise of religion.
However, there are some differences among Justices
with respect to the grounds and limits of the
accommodation. I should be emphasized that Justice
Brennan had underscored American history, traditions, and
heritage in order to determine whether a government action
seems as a permissible accommodation. This view has been
taken over by Justice Kennedy, and perhaps Chief Justice
Clause does not compel the exclusion of religious groups
from government benefits programs that are generally
available to a broad class of participants.").
^^° See e.g.. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct.
2157, 2172 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Whether the
Church would actually prevail under [Religious Freedom
Resolution Act of 1993] or not, the statute has provided
the Church with a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic
can obtain. This governmental preference for religion ...
is forbidden by the First Amendment."); United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("It is the overriding interest in keeping the
government - whether it be the legislature or the courts -
out of the business of evaluating the relative merits of
differing religious claims. The risk that governmental
approval of some and disapproval of others will be
perceived as favoring one religion over another is an
important risk the Establishment Clause was designed to
preclude."); see also Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The
Status and Prospects of "Tests" under the Religion Clause,
1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 323, 338 n.67.
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Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas. '^^^ To
emphasize American history, traditions, and heritage in
justifying accommodation might be reasonable and, in some
cases, persuasive. They could be a reason why such
accommodations are needed. However, those accommodations
could have a tendency to confer a benefit only on the
majority's religions or at least religions accepted by the
majority. The government's discretion to determine
whether it alleviates its burdens on religion is the
underlying factor of permissible accommodations;
furthermore, the extension of accommodation benefits to
minor or unpopular and not-welcome religions would not be
expected by following American history, traditions, and
heritage. Consequently, accommodation based on American
traditions may be utterly unfair to those religions . '"'"^
Moreover, relying solely on the past could maintain
unwelcome traditions of American society, such as racial
and gender discriminations . ''"'^
^^^ See Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2528 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("[0]ur Nation's long tradition [allows]
religious adherents to participate on equal terms in
neutral government programs.").
^^^ See also Tushnet, supra note 90, at 387
C [R] slaying on the historical record of community
acceptance of permissible accommodations [is] a distinctly
anticonstitutional stance, for constitutional limitations
are designed precisely because we cannot rely on
majorities to restrain themselves.").
'"'^ See County of Allegheny v. American Civil
Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 630 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
.
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Other Justices also adopted the principle of
religious neutrality. As one commentator indicates,
"[b]oth Justice Souter' s majority opinion and Justice
O'Connor's concurrence [in Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel
V. Grumet] suggested ways that the legislature could
accomplish its desire to accommodate [religious adherents]
while the same time remaining faithful to the requirement
of the First Amendment . "^'^ Neutrality toward religion is
the requirement . '^^ Although a specific standard for
neutrality has not been articulated by the Court, "^"^^ the
Court decided in Kiryas Joel that an accommodating law or
policy that confers a benefit on only one religion and
inclines not to give it to others fails the requirement of
the religious neutrality, and thus, it is
unconstitutional
.
It is true that the principle of neutrality gives us
a more objective concept to justify accommodation than to
follow American history, traditions, and heritage.
However, the rigid application of this principle may cause
serious problems to religious liberty. For example, under
the neutrality principle, government would have to exempt
from the criminal code peyote consumption for religious
ritual to many suspect religious groups other than native
^''' Basilios E. Tsingos, Forbidden Favoritism in the
Government Accommodation of Religion: Grumet and the Case
for Overturning Aguilar, 18 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 8 67,
887 (1995) .
"^^ Engstrom, supra note 35, at 133.
^^^ NowAK AND Rotunda, supra note 107, at 1218-1219.
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Americans. Likewise, it would have to exempt from
compulsory education children other than the Amish. In
other words, the principle could permit people to abuse
their rights in the name of religious liberty. This is
what the Constitution does not allow. Thus, one cannot
agree with the assessment advanced by one commentator that
"Justice Souter' s opinion ultimately provided ... more
guidance to government concerning the full range of steps
it could take to accommodate religion without violating
the Constitution. "-^^^
"""^ Tsingos, supra note 114, at 888.
CHAPTER III. SCHOLARLY DEBATE.
Commentators hold widely disparate views on the
principle of accommodation. Generally, there are three
sets of opinions. The first block is that accommodation
should be allowed; government should be able to take
religion into account when it engages in policy-making . ^^^
t^'; The second set of opinion holds that no accommodation is
acceptable, because secular policy of government must be
superior to religious needs. ^'^ The third view advocates a
certain kind of the accommodation; however, the decision
as to whether accommodation is needed belongs to the
judiciary, not to the legislature or executive branch. ^^^
In this chapter, I review these three sets of views,
focusing on the opinions of Professors Michael W.
McConnell, Laurence H. Tribe, Mark Tushnet, Ira C. Lupu,
and Kent Greenawalt.
A. Michael W. McConnell.
At the outset. Professor McConnell assigns the
primary value and purpose of the Religion Clause to the
promotion of religious liberty, '^^ and writes that "[t]he
118
119
120
121
See Infra text accompanying notes 121-149.
See infra text accompanying notes 150-170.
See infra text accompanying notes 171-181.
McConnell, supra note 4, at 1.
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main components of religious liberty are the autonomy of
the religious institutions, individual choice in matters
of religion, and the freedom to put a chosen faith (if
any) into practice . "'^^ According to him, religious
liberty means "the freedom to choose whether to engage in
religious practice and which (if any) to adopt, without
government coercion or interference . "'^^^ Professor
McConnell believes that the value of the free exercise of
religion should be preferred over the value of the
separation of religion and state in relation to the both
First Amendment clauses on religion . '^^'^
Based on his perception, Professor McConnell
considers that permissible government accommodation
fosters religious liberty . '''^^ For him, "an interpretation
of the Religious Clauses based on religious liberty"^^^
makes a clear line between permissible accommodations and
impermissible establishment, which is "an understanding of
the role of religion under the Constitution, within a
framework that acknowledges the legitimacy of encouraging
^22 Id.
^^^ Id. at 37.
^^^ Id. at 1 (" [S] ometimes separation diminishes
religious liberty."); id. at 2 ("[The separation of church
and state is] subsidiary, instrumental, values in ...
religious liberty.")
.
^^^ Id. at 3 ("[T]here exists a class of permissible
government action toward religion, which have as their
purpose and effect the facilitation of religious
liberty.")
.
^26 Id.
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and facilitating religious liberty. "^^^ Professor
McConnell argues that accommodation is needed especially
when individual believers are faced to choose between
"religious duties and obligations" and "the demands of
society, ""^^^ which creating a serious conflict. In this
circumstance, a religious accommodation purports to ease
those believers of the conflict between a religious belief
and the social order "without sacrificing significant
civic or social interests . "^^^ He explains the reason why
accommodation should not be restricted by the requirement
of the Free Exercise Clause that "the government is in a
better position than the courts to evaluate the strength
of its own interest in governing without religious
exceptions . ""^"^^ As to this sort of accommodation, a court
can examine it only when otherwise "the constitutional
rights of other persons"''"'^^ are seriously infringed.
Professor McConnell suggests that the crucial
distinction between permissible accommodation and
prohibited establishment is that the accommodation just
relieves religious believers from burdens on their free
exercise of religion, while the establishment is to induce
^^' Id. at 6.
^^^ Id. at 26.
""^^ Id; see also id. at 35 ("The purpose of an
accommodation is to enable a person to practice his faith,
usually by removing social or governmental obstacle.")
.
''' Id. at 31.
''' Id.
36
or solicit to practice religions government favors.'^ ^ For
this distinction, Professor McConnell indicates a three-
prong scrutiny:
(1) A law or policy is unconstitutional
if its purpose or likely effect is to
increase religious uniformity either by
inhibiting the religious practice of the
person or group challenging the law (free-
exercise clause) or by forcing or inducing a
contrary religious practice (establishment
clause); (2) a law or policy is
unconstitutional if its enforcement
interferes with the independence of a
religious body in matters of religious
significance to that body; (3) violation of
either of those principles will be permitted
only if it is the least restrictive means for
(a) protecting the private rights of others,
or (b) ensuring that the benefits and burdens
of public life are equitably shared . '^"^"^
Based on this understanding. Professor McConnell
criticizes the Lemon test,^^'' which has been a single test
to scrutinize the Establishment Clause cases for the past
twenty years. He argues that the Lemon test could not
^^^ McConnell, supra note 7, at 686 ("The key
difference between legitimate accommodation and
impermissible ^establishment' is that the former merely
removes obstacles to the exercise of a religious
conviction adopted for reasons independent of the
government's action, while the latter creates an incentive
or inducement ... to adopt that practice or conviction.").
^^^ Michael W. McConnell, Taking Religious Freedom
Seriously, in Religious Liberty in the Supreme Court 4 97, 506
(Terry Eastland ed., 1993).
"•^^ The Lemon test is a scrutiny that requires a law
or policy to have "a secular legislative purpose," not to
"advances nor inhibits religion," and not to "foster an
excessive government entanglement with religion." Lemon
V. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971) .
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affirm any kind of accommodation, because the purpose and
effect of an accommodation are clearly to promote
religion, which is entirely opposite to the Lemon test.'^
Government, in some cases, ^^necessarily advances religion
to accommodate the secular dictates of public policy to
the spiritual needs and concerns of religious
minorities . "^^^ Therefore, it can be said that the
facilitation of religious liberty do not coexist with and
the Lemon test.'^^^
B. Laurence H. Tribe.
Professor Tribe also recognizes the validity of
religious accommodation.''"^^ Like Professor McConnell,
Professor Tribe agrees with permissible government
^^^ McConnell, supra note 4, at 44 ("[U] under the
Lemon test, taken literally, no accommodation to religion
could ever be upheld. The ^purpose' of an accommodation i
splainly to facilitate religion, and that will be its
'effect' as well.")
.
"^^ McConnell, supra note 133, at 502. See also
Note, Tithing in Chapter 13—A Divine Creditor Exception to
Section 13257, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1125, 1135-1136 (1997) ("A
literal application of Lemon would automatically render
any type of accommodation unconstitutional.") .
"^"^^ McConnell, supra note 4, at 3 ("[T]he interest of
religious liberty and the rigors of the Lemon test are
most strikingly at cross-purposes.").
^^^ Tribe, supra note 17, § 14-4, at 1169 (2d ed. 1988) ("[T]he
concept [of accommodation] at least serves to highlight the way in
which the two religion clauses interact: cases within the area of
interaction are difficult precisely because different results are
arguably mandated by the two religion clauses."); see also id. § 14-
14, at 1276 ("[Accommodation] is ... essential to reconciling the
establishment clause with the free exercise clause and with other
freedom." (footnote omitted)).
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accommodation, ^"^^ and also argues that the free exercise of
religion prevails over the separation of religion and
state when both the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause run afoul of each other. ^''° He
realizes, too, that although there are some risks in
emasculating the Establishment Clause when government has
the unlimited authority to accommodate religion,
government act is more efficient than are the courts in
rendering accommodation . ''^''
In so doing. Professor Tribe suggests three factors
which make clear limits of permissible accommodation . "^^^
The first factor is whether an accommodation is given to a
particular sect of religion or religion at large. '^^'^ If it
passes "an evenhandedness requirement,"^'''' the
accommodation is valid. The second element is that if the
139
Id. § 14-4, at 1168 n.ll ("Legislature as well as courts
may be free to make such accommodations." (citation omitted)).
^^° Id. § 14-8, at 1201 ("[There is] the conclusion
that the free exercise principle should be dominant when
it conflicts with the anti-establishment principle. Such
dominance is the natural result of tolerating religion as
broadly as possible rather than thwarting at all costs
even the faintest appearance of establishment.")
.
^^^ Id. § 14-7, at 1195 ("Leaving room for
legislatures to craft religious accommodations recognizes
that they may be in a better position than courts to
decide [whether they should offer the accommodations].
But unbounded tolerance of governmental accommodation in
the name of free exercise neutrality could eviscerate the
establishment clause." (footnote omitted)).
^^^ Id. § 14-7, at 1198.
"^ Id.
''' Id.
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accommodation decreases "regulatory entanglement between
church and state, "^''^ it is seen as legitimate. The third
factor is whether the accommodation lifts government-
imposed burden on religion . ^''^ If the accommodation aims
to reduce "privately imposed"^''^ burden, it can not be seen
as permissible.
Professor Tribe focuses here on costs that are raised
from the exemption of government burden on religion. He
understands that some unrelated and innocent people have
to answer those costs. Even so, however, there is an
underlying boundary that government should not ask the
public to accept in the name of religious accommodation,
such as allowing murder, stealing, and fraud. '^''^ Finally,
for the price of accommodation. Professor Tribe implies
that government could offer alternatives to those who seek
religious exemption, which do not burden their religion . '''^
^^^ Id. Although Professor Tribe does not mention,
this factor may validate the property tax exemption upheld
in Walz V. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)
.
^'' Id.
^""^ Id. § 14-1 , at 1199 (footnote omitted) .
^^^ Id. § 14-13, at 1258 ("Certain widely recognized
harms - such as physical injury - can be prevented even at
the cost of infringing religious freedom.")
.
^"^ Id. § 14-13, at 1266 ("The use of conscientious
objectors in paramedical or other non-military role could
meet both the personal argument and the morale argument."
(footnote omitted) )
.
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C. Mark Tushnet
.
In following Professor Philip Kurland' s strict
neutrality theory, ^^° Professor Tushnet stands in a
position that refuses any kind of accommodation to
religion . '^^^ He insists that accommodation is against the
Establishment Clause, '^^'' because it is, in fact, government
endorsement of religion . '"^'^
Professor Tushnet shows his skepticism by arguing
that accommodation or exemption from generally applicable
laws may well be administered "in a troublingly
discriminatory manner . "'^^'^ Government tends to preserve
major religions "by enacting exemptions under the doctrine
of permissible accommodation of religion or by avoiding
enactments that have a troublesome impact on"'^^^ those
religions. "[Rjeligions on the close-in borders of the
It is to summarize Kurland' s theory that government cannot
take religion into account when it makes policies, see Philip
Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1 (1961) .
Tushnet, supra note 90, at 376-377, 384 (saying that,
according to Professor Kurland, both required and permissible
accommodations are not acceptable under the Religious Clause.).
^^^ Id. at 384.
153
Id. at 390 ("[A]n exemption confined to religion must
signal government endorsement of religion as such.").
154 Mark Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse, 1993
BYU L. Rev. 117, 134.
^" Id.
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mainstream""^^^ can easily get a protection from courts.
However, odd religions are outside of their protection . ^^^
Professor Tushnet raises the difficulties created by
the Court's criteria that limit the boundary of
permissible accommodation. As to Justice Kennedy's
noncoercive test,^^^ he criticizes it in two points.
First, this test may "deprive the Establishment Clause of
meaning independent of the Free Exercise Clause, which
standing alone would seem to ban government coercion of
religious belief or observance . "^^^ Secondly, Justice
Kennedy's dependence to American history, traditions, and
heritage, and reference to communities'''^^ as justifications
of accommodation, allows "a majority of the citizens of a
community ... [to do] what they want to do."'^^'^ It may have
some tendency to accommodate only religions that they
prefer, and to discriminate against those eccentric
1 fro
religions. Professor Tushnet writes that this is
exactly what the Establishment Clause prohibits . ''^^
''' Id.
157 Id ("[N] either the courts nor the legislature protect [Sj
exotic religions.").
ICQ
See supra text accompanying note 93.
159 Tushnet, supra note 90, at 386.
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
Tushnet, supra note 90, at 386.
Id ("[T]hey are simply reflecting their own religious
preference on matters of specifically religious concern.").
^^^ Id. at 386-387 ("'[T]his kind of government affiliation
with particular religious messages is precisely what the
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Professor Tushnet divides Justice Brennan' s standard
for permissible accommodation^^'^ in to two parts:
"Accommodations of religion are permissible if they (a)
^remove burdens on the free exercise of religion, ' which
can be imposed by governments ..., and {b) are sufficiently
broad [enough to other non-religious activities] ."''' ^
Although Professor Tushnet concedes that Justice Brennan'
s
standard "... is undeniably attractive, "'"'^^ he finds there
are "some doctrinal dif f iculties . "^^"^ According to
Professor Tushnet, the standard may not accord with
accommodation provisions of Title VII of Civil Rights Act
of 1964,"^^^ since this provision alleviates employees from
burdens imposed by their employer, ^^^ and not by
government . '^'^^
Establishment Clause precludes.'" (quoting County of Allegheny v.
American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 601 n.51 (1989))),
164 See supra text accompanying with note 85.
Id. at 391 (quoting County of Allegheny v. American Civil
Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 601 n.51 (1989))).
Tushnet, supra note 90, at 391.
''' Id.
^^^ 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992));
see also supra note 74.
^^^ Tushnet, supra note 90, at 392 ("A statutory
requirement of reasonable accommodation would ... relieve
that burden, though surely the burden Congress really had
in mind was the one placed on the employee by an
employer's failure to accommodate.").
^^° Id. at 393 n.69 ("It may be ... that the
^reasonable accommodation' requirement is inconsistent
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D. Ira C. Lupu.
Defining that required accommodations concern free
exercise issues and permissive accommodations always
bring about Establishment Clause cases, ^^'' Professor Lupu
asserts that there are "important institutional
differences ... between mandatory and permissive
accommodations."^''^ The authority to offer required
accommodation belongs to courts, and on the other hand,
the other branches of government may confer permissible
accommodation . "^^^
Professor Lupu suggests that it is unavoidable to
confront permissible accommodation with the Establishment
Clause "because of the extent to which it unleashes
politics in the service of religion . ""^^^ He indicates
difficulties inherent in the accommodation that a policy
of permissible accommodation usually contains "religion-
specific"'^^^ factors. Thus, the accommodating policy tends
with Justice Brennan' s theory of permissible
accommodation.")
.
171
Lupu, supra note 18, at 751 ("Claims to mandatory
accommodations always present free exercise questions, because their
underlying theory is that the Free Exercise Clause is violated if the
accommodation is not provided. Claims to permissive accommodations
always raise Establishment Clause questions, because their underlying
theory is that government is free to respond beneficially to
religion-specific concerns.").
172
Id. at 753.
''' Id.
^''^ Id. at 754.
^^^ Id. at 768.
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to favor religion over non-religion.'^''^ In saying so,
Professor Lupu states that permissible accommodation is
unconstitutional . ''''' He shows several dangers in
permissible accommodation. First, the accommodation could
"be overbroad, [because] it will encompass relief for both
those who are entitled to it and those who are not."^^®
Second, it may cause religious favoritism. '^^^ The third
danger is that it is likely "to discriminate against non-
religious association . ""^^° Instead, Professor Lupu
believes that required accommodation is the only way to
lift burdens form religion, which is regulated by the
judicial branch . '^''
E. Kent Greenawalt.
Professor Greenawalt agrees with that the words of
Religious Clauses and those histories justify a certain
kind of religious accommodation . "'^^ He thinks that it is
"^''^ Id ("Such policies always prefer religion to
their non-religious counterparts." (footnote omitted)).
'''^ Id. at 771 (" [P] ermissive accommodations should
be eliminated.").
^^^ Id. at 776 n.l66 (citation omitted).
^^^ Id. at 776-778.
^^° Id. at 778.
'^^^ Id. at 780 ("Courts would have maximum authority
to police the boundaries of state-religion interaction.")
But see Employment Div., v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) (The Court denied a religious claim seeking
accommodation in the courts)
.
"^^^ Greenawalt, supra note 110, at 340.
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not an endorsement of religion to accommodate whose
belief and practices are likely to clash with the social
order. ^^^ Like as Professor McConnell , ^^"^ Professor
Greenawalt conceives that an accommodation or exemption
that induces nonbelievers to convert to a religion is
unconstitutional."^^^
Professor Greenawalt also suggests the possibility of
imposing alternative burdens on religious believers for
the price of benefited accommodations. According to
him, the alternative burdens could reduce the concern of
not favoring religion over non-religion caused by
conferring accommodations solely to religion . '^^'^ The
alternative burdens also prevent false accommodation
claims of which government needs to remove from
accommodation policies. Therefore, "few would choose [the
^^^ Id. at 340-341
^^^ See supra text accompanying note 132.
"^^ Greenawalt, supra note 110, at 358 {"[I]t need
not grant an exemption that would strongly induce others
to practice a religion, since such inducements violate the
Establishment Clause." (footnote omitted)).
^^^ Id. at 357 n.l32 ("One important avenue of
investigation is whether some alternative burden, like
alternative civilian service for conscientious objectors,
may be placed upon religious claimants, so that overall
burdens are not too disproportionate." (citation
omitted) )
.
^^^ Id ("Exemptions for religious claimants alone do
raise serious equal protection concern. These can be
mitigated by alternative burdens." (citation omitted)).
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accommodation] unless they were deeply opposed to"'^^^
generally applicable laws,'^^^
Unlike Professor McConnell, Professor Greenawalt
asserts that permissible accommodation corresponds with
the Lemon test, though he repeatedly states that the test
"has ... been abandoned . "^^^ Despite having a non-secular
purpose and an effect advancing religion, such
accommodations are "understood as secular or acceptable
religious accommodation . "^^^ Under the Lemon test, "the
Court can simply say that a law that works an appropriate
accommodation is permissible, without having to ^explain'
either that accommodation is not a purpose and primary
effect that advances religion or that some purposes and
primary effects that advance religion are really all
right. "^^^
Professor Greenawalt insists that the Establishment
Clause should articulate the clear limitation of any sort
of accommodations . '"^^ He characterizes that "[t]he
'°° Id.
""^^ See also Jesse Choper, The Rise and Decline of
the Constitutional Protection of Religious Liberty, 70
Neb. L. Rev. 651, 680 (1991) ("This would minimize any
incentive to file fraudulent claims, and reduce the
likelihood that government exemption would induce people
to adopt certain beliefs, thus avoiding establishment
clause problems." (footnote omitted)).
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Greenawalt, supra note 110, at 361-362.
Id. at 367.
Id.
Id. at 381 ("Whether an accommodation is claimed
to be constitutionally required or is chosen by a
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distinction between lifting burdens and promoting religion
is partly one of conceptual dif ferentiation . "'^^^ However,
he leaves this question for further analysis . ^^^
legislature, the Establishment Clause restricts what is
constitutionally permissible.")
.
^^' Id. at 386.
"""^^ Id. at 387 ("[No] easy categorization of
impermissible promotion versus permissible compensation
resolves this problem; a deeper analysis is required."
(footnote omitted) )
.
CHAPTER IV. LAW OF RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN GERMANY AND
JAPAN
.
In this chapter, I want to make reference to statutes
and cases in both Germany and Japan that address religious
accommodation. Although the relationship of the German
government to religion is quite different from that of in
the United States, "^^^ and religious atmosphere in Japan is
also different from that in America, "^^^ it is sufficiently
useful to know how these two countries adopt statutory
accommodations or decide judicial accommodations.
Furthermore, it appears that both countries make good
examples with respect to "alternative burden" on religious
believers as the price of the accommodation.''"^^
"^^^ Germany has adopted "a concordant system which
clearly separates the area managed by religious
organization from area managed by the government." Yokota,
supra note 1, at 205. See also Kommers, supra note 2, at
444 ("The multiplicity of the Basic Law's provisions on
church-state relations contrasts sharply with the simple
command of the U.S. Constitution.")
.
"^^ See Yokota, supra note 1, at 206 ("The religious
consciousness of Japanese people is different from that of
... Americans .... Most Japanese do not have a single faith,
such as Christianity .... [T]he attitude [of Japanese
people] toward religion is best demonstrated by the fact
that most Japanese take a newly born baby to [a] Shinto
shrine, visit a Shinto shrine to celebrate the New Year,
have a Christian or Shinto wedding, and are buried in a
Buddhist funeral." (citation omitted)).
"^^ See supra text accompanying notes 149, 186-189.
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A. Germany.
As to religious liberty, the Basic Law (Grundgesetz)
,
which is, in effect, the German constitution, provides in
Article 4:
(1) Freedom of faith, of conscience, and
freedom of creed, religious or ideological
(weltanschaulich) , shall be inviolable.
(2) The undisturbed practice of religion is
guaranteed
.
(3) No one may be compelled against his
conscience to render war service involving
the use of arms. Details shall be regulated
by a federal law.'''^^
Discrimination based on religion, ^°° involuntary disclosure
of religious conviction, ^^'^ and coercion to participate or
practice religion, ^°^ are also banned by other provisions.
Autonomy for religious groups is also protected by Basic
Law.^°^ In contrast with other constitutional liberties,
religious liberty is not restrained by the reservation
clause of the Basic Law.^°''
""^^ §4 GG (Germany) , translated in Kommers, supra note
2, at 444.
^°° §§ 3 (3) , 33 (3) GG.
^°^ § 136 (2) Weimar Constitution of 1919,
incorporated by § 14 GG.
2°2 Id.
^°^ § 137 (2) Weimar Constitution of 1919,
incorporated by § 14 GG
.
^°'^ Kommers, supra note 2, at 444.
The reservation clause prescribes:
(1) Insofar as under this Basic Law a basic
right may be restricted by or pursuant to a
law, the law must apply generally and not
50
On the relationship between religion and the state,
German practice differs greatly from the American
approach. ^°^ Although Basic Law prohibits having a state
religion, ^°^ and government is required to be neutral
toward religion, ^^"^ the Law allows religious instructions
in public schools, ^°^ and gives corporate religious
solely to an individual case. Furthermore
the law must name the basic right,
indicating the Article.
(2) In no case may a basic right be infringed
upon in its essential content.
(3) The basic rights apply also to
corporations established under German Public
law to the extent that the nature of such
rights permits.
(4) Should any person's right be violated by
public authority, recourse to the court
shall be open to him. If no other court has
jurisdiction, recourse shall be to the
ordinary courts.
§ 19 GG, translated in General Electric' s Germany & Europe
Round Table, BASIC LAW for the Federal Republic of Germany
(17 Aug. 1993)
<gopher : //wiretap . spies .com: 7 0/00/Gov/World/germany . con>
.
^°^ KOMMERS, supra note 2, at 445 ("The meaning of
nonestablishment in Germany differs significantly from its
meaning in the United States." (footnote omitted)).
^°^ § 137 (1) Weimar Constitution of 1919,
incorporated by § 140 GG, translated in General Electric'
s
Germany & Europe Round Table, supra note 204.
^°^ KoMMERS, supra note 2, at 445.
In Germany, religious neutrality means
nonintervention, nonidentification, equality, and
cooperation with religion by government, see id. at 472.
^°^ § 7 (3) GG, translated in General Electric'
s
Germany & Europe Round Table, supra note 204.
It provides:
Religious instruction forms part of the
ordinary curriculum in state and municipal
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organizations power to impose taxes, ^°^ As the German
constitutional law recognizes a significant character of
religion "in the nation's public life,"^^° it permits
religion to get into public places, such as military
bases, hospital, and prisons, for religious practice. ^^^
When one's religious liberty conflicts with social
order regulated by generally applicable laws, it is the
court's task balance of "the interests of both the
schools, excepting secular schools. Without
prejudice to the state's right of
supervision, religious instruction is given
in accordance with the tenets of the
religious communities. No teacher may be
obliged against his will to give religious
instruction
.
^°^ § 137 (2) Weimar Constitution of 1919,
incorporated by § 140 GG, translated in General Electric'
s
Germany & Europe Round Table, supra note 204.
It provides:
Religious bodies forming corporations
with public rights are entitled to levy taxes
on the basis of the civil tax rolls, in
accordance with the provisions of Land law.
^•'"° KoMMERS, supra note 2, at 445.
^^^ § 141 Weimar Constitution of 1919, incorporated
by § 140 GG, translated in General Electric' s Germany &
Europe Round Table, supra note 204.
It provides:
Religious bodies shall have the right of
entry for religious purposes into the army,
hospitals, prisons, or other public
institutions, so far as is necessary for the
arrangement of public worship or the exercise
of pastoral offices, but every form of
compulsion must be avoided.
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[religious] individual and society. "^^' Religious liberty
can be always supported as long as it does not harm "the
good order of the community . "^^^
As to permissible accommodation, the Basic Law
provides a conscientious objector provision. '' In 1956,
when German government started compulsory military
service, ^^^ it exempted the service from conscientious
objectors because of the constitutional provision.
However, the government imposed an alternative burden on
conscientious objectors, ^'^ such as to work at hospitals.
In 1968, this alternative burden for civilian service"'^' as
KoMMERS, supra note 2, at 4 51.
^"^ Id; see also Blood Transfusion case, BVerGE 32
(1971), 98. For English summary of this case, see Kommers,
supra note 2, at 451-455.
^"^ § 4 (3) GG; see supra text accompanying notes
199.
^"^ Kommers, supra note 2, at 4 62.
''' Id.
^^"^ § 12a (2) GG, incorporated by § 140 GG,
translated in General Electric' s Germany & Europe Round
Table, supra note 204.
It provides:
A person who refuses, on grounds of
conscience, to render war service involving
the sue of arms may be required to render a
substitute service. The duration of such
substitute service shall not exceed the
duration of military service. Details shall
be regulated by a statute which shall not
interfere with freedom to take a decision
based on conscience and shall also provide
for the possibility of a substitute service
not connected with units of the Armed Forces
or of the Federal Border Guard.
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well as the military service^'^^ was written into the Basic
Law.^^^ German Constitutional Court considered the
alternative burden as security for the neutrality to
religion over non-religion . ^^°
Article 12 (2) of Basic Law states "[t]he duration of
such substitute service shall not exceed the duration of
military service . "^^^ Therefore, the period of
"substitutive service" had been regarded as the same term
as that of military service. In 1983, the government
enacted a law "which extended the period of compulsory
civilian service to twenty months, five months longer than
the fifteen months required of military conscripts . "^^^ It
supposed that only good faith objectors would agree to
spend substituting service for a period a third more than
^^^ § 12a (1) GG, incorporated by § 140 GG,
translated in General Electric' s Germany & Europe Round
Table, supra note 204.
It provides:
Men who have attained the age of 18
years may be required to serve in the Armed
Forces, in the Federal Border Guard, or in a
civil defense organization.
^^^ KOMMERS, supra note 2, at 4 62-4 63.
^^° See Objector Notification case, BVerGE 48 (1978),
127. For English summary of this case, see Kommers, supra
note 2, at 464
.
^^^ See supra note 217.
^^^ Kommers, supra note 2, at 4 65.
In addition to fifteen months of military duty, they
need to spend nine months of reserve duty, in which they
"may be called up for" national crisis. Id.
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the usual term of military service. ^^^ However, because
this enactment literally contradicted the words of Article
12a (2), the Constitutional Court reviewed the
constitutionality of the law.^^'' The Constitutional Court
o o c
upheld the act, saying that it was substantially equal
between military service and substituting service, even
though conscientious objectors had to go through the duty
five months longer. Moreover, it permitted the government
authority "to ... lay down durational requirements that seek
to balance the burden of military and nonmilitary
service, "^^^ unless the total period for substituting
service was less than "twenty-four months (fifteen in
basic training and nine on reserve duty) ." ^^"^
B. Japan.
Japanese Constitutional Law provides provisions with
respect to both the free exercise of religion and
separation of religion and state. Article 20 states:
(1) Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all.
No religious organization shall receive any
privileges from the State, nor exercise any
political authority.
''' Id.
''' Id.
^^^ Extended Alternative Service case, BVerGE 69
(1985), 1. For English summary of this case, see Kommers,
supra note 2, at 4 65.
^^^ Kommers, supra note 2, at 4 65.
22^ Id.
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2) No person shall be compelled to take part
in any religious acts, celebration, rite or
practice
.
3) The State and its organs shall refrain
from religious education or any other
religious activity. ^^^
Moreover, Article 89 prohibits government from conferring
financial aid on religious organizations .^^^
As a matter of fact, the issue of religious
accommodation had not been seen as an important judicial
matter, since the Japanese people are not observant
generally and easily accept government' policies that
accommodate religion. ^^° Furthermore, the Japanese
sometimes compromise their religious belief to comply with
in the social order. For those reasons, it was hardly
likely for religious accommodation to become an issue in
the courts. ^^'^
^^^ Kenpo (Japan), art. 20, para. 3, translated in
Japanese Constitutional Law 321 (Percy R. Luney, Jr. & Kazuyuki
Takahashi eds
.
, 1993) .
^^^ Kenpo, art. 89.
It proscribes:
No public money or other property shall
be expended or appropriated for the use,
benefit or maintenance of any religious
institution or association ....
translated in Japanese Constitutional Law, supra note
228, at 327-328.
^''° See supra note 197.
^^'^ Until the Japanese Supreme Court held Matsumoto
V. Kobayashi (Kobe City College of Technology Case) , 906
Hanrei Taimuzu 77 (Sup. Ct
.
, Mar. 8, 1996), there were only
two cases in lower courts that dealt with religious
accommodation, see Ito Masami, Kenpo 270 (3d ed. 1995) .
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There is other feature in Japanese establishment
cases, that is, a historical factor. In the early
twentieth century, the then largely military government
ruling Japan, adopted Shinto^^^ as an ideology to unify and
control the people in the name of Ten'no, the Japanese
Emperor [Kokka Shinto) . Since many Japanese people
suffered from the government policy unifying their minds
into one, the establishment cases tend to reflect people's
fear against the connection between Shinto and the
government .^^^
In 1996, the Japanese Supreme Court for the first
time decided an accommodation case in Matsumoto v.
Kobayashi (Kobe City College of Technology Case).^^^
Before discussing this case, it is necessary to examine
the establishment case law in Japan.
^^^ Shinto is Japanese native religion, which
worships one's ancestors, a historical person, a certain
tree, stone, mirror, and sword, etc.
I want to emphasize that believing in Shinto does not
necessarily connect with worship to Japanese Emperor.
Some Shinto shrine, such as Izumo Taisha, in Shimane
Prefecture, was established by the Emperor at that time to
comfort the spirit of his enemy. In this sense, the
description of one commentator is wrong, Eric N. Weeks, A
Widow's Might: Nakaya v. Japan and Japan's Current State
of Religious Freedom, 1995 BYU L. Rev. 691, 693-695. I am
disappointed that some of Japanese historical and cultural
features are still misunderstood among American people in
the light of exoticism.
^"^"^ See infra cases accompanying notes 235-256.
"^ 906 Hanrei Taimuzu 77 (Sup. Ct . , Mar. 8, 1996).
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(1) The establishment clause test: Tsu City case and The
Serviceman Enshrinement case.
The Supreme Court of Japan has considered that the
relationship between religion and the state can not be a
rigid one. The leading case for this view is Kakunaga v.
Sekiguchi (Tsu City case).'^'^^ This case involved whether
Tsu City, Mie Prefecture, which held a religious
groundbreaking ceremony {j ichinsai) and paid 7,663 yen as
the cost of the ceremony when it began to construct its
gymnasium, ^^^ violated the establishment clause of the
Japanese Constitution . ^^^ The district court concluded
that the city did not violate the clause "on the ground
that the ceremony was secular and customary," and "the
expenditures were not for the purpose of assisting any
particular religious organization . "^"^^ The high court (the
court of appeal) reversed the district court's ruling,
saying, "[s]ince the Constitution provides the strict
separation of religion and state, the ceremony falls into
the religious activity which is prohibited by Article 20,
paragraph 3."^^^ The Supreme Court finally upheld the
^^^ 31 MiNSHU 533 (Sup. Ct . , Jul. 13, 1977).
^"^^ Id. 536-537, translated in Lawrence W. Beer and
HiROSHi ITOH, The Constitutional Case Law of Japan, 197 through
1990, 478 (1996) .
The religious ceremony was held in the way of Shinto.
^^'' See Kenpo, art. 20, para. 3.
^^^ Kakunaga, 31 Minshu at 537, translated in Beer and
ITOH, supra note 236, at 479.
"^ Id.
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ceremony, explaining that it was not the activity the
Constitution proscribed.
In so deciding, the Supreme Court described its
standpoint for the interpretation of the establishment
clause
:
The principle of separation of religion
and ... [s]tate has been understood [as the
secularism and religious neutrality of the
government which] mean that [issues] of
religion and belief have been considered
matters of individual conscience that
transcend the dimension of politics and are
separated from [government] , which, as the
holder of secular authority, is not to
interfere with religion .'^''°
The Constitution [must] be interpreted
as striving for a secular and religiously
neutral [government] by talcing as its ideal
the total separation of religion and ...
[s]tate.2^^
The separation of religion and ...
[s]tate, however, is only [an institutional]
guarantee of religious freedom. It does not
directly guarantee freedom of religion pre
se, it attempts to guarantee it indirectly by
securing a system that separates religion and
... [s]tate.^^^
It is inevitable to say that there is a
certain inherent limit in the separation of
religion and state. When the principle of
the separation of religion and state would be
embodied as an actual national institution.
^''° Id. at 538, translated in Beer and Itoh, supra note
236, at 479
^^"^ Id. at 539, translated in Beer and Itoh, supra note
236, at 480 (emphasis added
^^^ Id. at 539-540, tr
note 236, at 480 (first emphasis added
anslated in Beer and Itoh, supra
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the issue is that in what case and to what
extent the relationship would not be
permitted, ... premising that a certain
relationship between religion and state is in
fact inevitable, in the light of its own
social and cultural characteristics.^''^
The principle does not prohibit all the
relationship between religion and state,
while it requires the religious neutrality of
the government. It prohibits the
relationship which would be seen as to exceed
reasonable boundary in the light of those
[social and cultural] characteristics, taking
into consideration the purpose and effect of
the government activities which entail the
relationship.^^''
Religious activity which Article 3,
paragraph 3 prescribes should be defined ... as
the activity whose purpose has religious
meaning and whose effect supports, promotes,
and fosters, or oppresses and interferes with
religion .^''^
In determining whether a certain
activity consists with a religious activity,
it is not enough to focus only the fact in
appearance, such as whether the master of the
activity is a clergy, or whether the content
of it belongs religion. Rather, the issue
must be decided objectively, based on a
common sense of the society {syakai tsuunen)
,
taking into account all the circumstances,
such as the place the activity was held,
people's evaluation on the activity, the
purpose, intent, and religious recognition of
the government which held the activity, and
the effect and influence of the activity with
people .^^^
243
244
245
Id. at 540-541.
Id. at 541.
Id.
^"^ Id. at 541-542
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The standard that the Supreme Court announced in this
case was that the prohibited religious activity is "the
activity whose purpose has religious meaning and whose
effect supports, promotes, and fosters, or oppresses and
interferes with religion . "^''^ It has become the standard
for the establishment cases.
The Supreme Court of Japan affirmed this purpose-and-
effect test {mokuteki kouka kijun) in Japan v. Nakaya (The
Serviceman Enshrinement Case).^^^ In this case, the
appellee, a Japanese Christian whose husband "was killed
in a traffic accident while on his duty, "^''^ brought a suit
against the Self Defense Force (SDF) , the Japanese
military, for which her husband worked. The appellee
asked for the damages because of the injury of her right
to live in a religiously peaceful atmosphere caused by an
application made by others to the Gokoku Shrine^^° for his
enshrinement, which "is the conferring ... of the status of
^^'' See supra text accompanying note 245.
^^^ 42 MiNSHU 277 (Sup. Ct . , Jun . 1, 1988).
Some American commentators addressed this case, see
e.g.. Stone et al., supra note 5, at 1570; Weeks, supra note
232; Mark J. Osiel, Ever Again: Legal Rememheranee of
Administrative Massacre, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 463, 607
(1995) .
^''^ Nakaya, 42 Minshu at 279, translated In Beer and
ITOH, supra note 236, at 496.
^^° Gokoku Shrine is a regional branch of Yasukunl
Shrine, which used to be a symbolic place for Kokka
Shinto.
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[a] god upon a mortal person, "^^^ This sort of
enshrinement happens occasionally in Shinto religion. She
also alleged that both a regional office of the SDF and
its veterans' association arranged the application. The
district court and the high court gave her damages finding
that the application had been made by the SDF and the
association and that her right had been infringed.
However, the Supreme Court reversed, partly because there
was no state action in this case,^^^ and partly because
"[t]he interest of living one's religious life in a
peaceful religious atmosphere, [which the appellee
^^^ WiNNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, PAYING THE WORDS EXTRA:
Religious Discourse in the Supreme Court of the United States 103,
n.80 (1994) .
^" Nakaya, 42 Minshu at 283 ("The actions actually
taken by the [SDF] staff were only the following: [a SDF
staff] asked [other regional offices of the SDF] about the
status of joint enshrinement of dead SDF members in their
area, and shared their answers with [the association; an
other staff did a favor for the association to draft a
guidance for the enshrinement {Hosei Junsoku) ] and letters
from [the association] asking for donation, [to distribute
those letters, to keep] custody of donated funds, [to
collect] the certified copies [necessary for the
enshrinement] . No facts show that [the regional office]
or its staff directly approached Gokoku Shrine for the
joint enshirnement . [Therefore,] although it is true that
[the regional office] cooperated with [the association] by
performing clerical work, the application under the name
of [the association] was [the independent action held by
the association substantively. Thus, it] cannot be
regarded as a joint action of [the regional office] staff
and [the association, and as the application the staff
also made]." {translated in Beer and Itoh, supra note 236,
at 499) ) .
62
asserted, was] of such a nature that it cannot be
recognized [necessarily] as a legal right. "^^"^
In evaluating whether the SDF engaged in the
religious activity, the Supreme Court adopted the same
analysis described in the Tsu City case:
Religious activity under [Article 20,
paragraph 3 of the Constitution] should not
be construed to include any acts related to
religion, but to mean only those acts whose
purpose has religious meaning and whose
effect is to [support, promote, and foster,
or oppresses and interferes] with religion.
When we examine whether a certain action
constitutes religious activity, we should
decide objectively, [based on common sense of
the society, taking into account all the
circumstances, such as the place the activity
was held, people's evaluation on the
activity, the purpose, intent, and religious
recognition of the government which held the
activity, the effect and influence of the
activity on people]. ^^"^
[J]oint enshrinement [is] conducted
by the independent decisions of [Gokoku
Shrine] ; so an application is not a
prerequisite. [Though] it related to
religion, the application in this case
[should] not be regarded as a legal
prerequisite for enshrinement. The actual
actions of the [SDF] staff in cooperation
with [the association had] an indirect
relationship with religion and their purpose
and intention were assumed to be to raise the
social status and morale of SDF members.
Hence, they had little religious
consciousness, [and we cannot conclude that
people would observe the manners of their
^^^ Id. at 288, translated in Beer and Itoh, supra note
236, at 501.
^^^ Id. at 285 (citing Kakunaga v. Sekiguchi (Tsu City
case), 31 Minshu 533, 541-542 (Sup. Ct
.
, Jul. 13, 1977)),
translated in Beer and Itoh, supra note 236, at 499-500.
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actions as those which has the effect as a
government activity to attract attention to a
particular religion, or to support, promote,
and foster, or oppresses and interferes with
religion] . Thus, though they had a
relationship to religion, the acts of the
[SDF] staff cannot be considered religious
activity.^"
Article 20, paragraph 3 of the
Constitution provides for separation of
religion and ... [s]tate; it is known as
providing a systemic guarantee, and does not
guarantee religious freedom itself directly
to individual persons. Rather, it attempts
indirectly to assure freedom of religion by
setting forth [limits] of the acts in which
the [government] may not engage and
guaranteeing the separation as a system.
Therefore, religious acts of the [government]
which violate this provision should not
necessarily be considered unlawful in
relation to individual persons unless they
directly infringe upon their religious
freedom as guaranteed by the Constitution .^^^
It might seem that the purpose-and-ef fect test is
similar to the Lemon test,^^^ which was used by the U.S.
Supreme Court. ^^^ There are, however, several differences
between the two tests. At first, the test in Japan did
255 Id. at 286, translated in Beer and Itoh, supra note
236, at 500.
"^ Id. at 286-287 (citing Kakunaga (Tsu City case),
31 MiNSHU at 539-540)
,
translated in Beer and Itoh, supra
note 236, at 500.
^^^ As to the Lemon test, see supra note 134.
^^^ See Yokota, supra note 1, at 216.
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not adopt the entanglement prong of the Lemon test.^^^
Second, a government activity could be invalid under the
Lemon test (or even under the test articulated in School
Dist. of Abington v. Schempp^^^) if it has either purpose
or effect to promote or inhibit religion. By contrast,
the activity would not be invalid under the Japanese test
even if it has both purpose and effect to promote religion
unless it "exceed [s] reasonable boundary in the light of
social and cultural characteristics . "^^^ In this sense,
the Japanese test seems to be less strict than the Lemon
test. Finally, the Japanese test takes into account
"common sense of the society. "^^^ This means that if the
majority of the society does not, in fact, perceive the
activity as a religious, the activity may be considered to
^^^ See id ("The Japanese Supreme Court standard
differs from the American three-prong test in [the
excessive entanglement prong].").
One commentator believes that the "purpose-and-
effect" test also requires government not to entangle in
religion. Weeks, supra note 232, at 713, but it is wrong.
^^° 374 U.S. 203 (1963) .
^^^ Kakunaga v. Sekiguchi (Tsu City case) , 31 Minshu
533, 540 (Sup. Ct., Jul. 13, 1977).
One commentator analyzes the "purpose-and-ef fect"
test in the same way as to do for the Lemon test. Weeks,
supra note 235, at 709-713. I think that his analysis and
the comparison do not make any sense, because the Japanese
test is significantly different in this point from the
Lemon test.
^" Id. at 542.
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be valid even though it has the purpose and effect to
promote or inhibit religion. ^^^
(2) Matsumoto v. Kobayashi (Kobe City College of
Technology Case) .^^'^
As mentioned above, this is the first case in which
the Supreme Court of Japan dealt with religious
accommodation
.
The appellee was a student of Kobe City College of
Technology, a public college. He was a serious believer
in the Jehovah's Witness faith. Kobe City College
required its students to take physical training. In fact,
since 1990, the college has adopted Kendo^^^ as a mandatory
program of training for the first year students. Before
the whole physical training class started, the appellee,
who believed that it was against his religious tenet to
practice Kendo, asked teachers of the college to submit
papers instead of participating classes of Kendo training.
The teachers denied his request, however, and said that
his lack of participation would be counted as absence from
the class if the appellee did not practice Kendo. The
appellant, the principal of the college, finally made a
decision not to accommodate him. The appellee did not
^^^ See Yokota, supra note 1, at 217 ("[taking into
account ^common sense of the society' ] supports the views
of the majority [of society] over those of the
minority. ")
.
^^^ 906 Hanrei Taimuzu 77 (Sup. Ct., Mar. 8, 1996).
^^^ Kendo is Japanese style of fencing, or
swordmanship
.
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oversteps the limits of the discretion, or is
an abuse of the discretion. However, a
decision of dismissal of a student from the
college is a crucial disposition which
deprives status of a student. [Thus,] the
principal may choose the decision of
dismissal only when the exclusion of the
student is educationally compelling, and more
careful consideration is required. [The]
decision at issue is invalid as clearly
inappropriate as in light of the common sense
of society, and has gone beyond the limits of
the discretion .^^^
In a college, practicing Kendo is not
said to be a requirement. It is possible to
substitute to practice other sport to
accomplish the aim of physical training.
[It] is obvious that the appellee's
disadvantage was extreme, because he was
dismissed as a result of his refusal to
practice Kendo based on his religious belief,
though he had good grades in other courses.
Moreover, the decision in this case surely
was of a character which obliged the appellee
to practice Kendo, against his religious
tenet in order to avoid his extreme
disadvantage. The decision itself did not
mandate to do what is against his religion
and did not directly restrict his free
exercise of religion. [Since] the decision
had such features, the appellant had to
accommodate the appellee when the appellant
made decision as an exercise of discretion.
[Given] the characters of the decision, the
appellant should consider the proprieties,
manners, and conditions of substituting
measures for Kendo practicing, until it
finally gave the decision. Nevertheless, we
can not say that the appellant took such
measures into account here.^^°
The appellant alleges that to take the
substituting measures would violate Article
^^^ Matsumoto, 906 Hanrei Taimuzu, at 80 (citation
omitted'
^^° Id. at 80-81.
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20, paragraph 3 of the Constitution.
However, to give a grade in a physical
training course to a student who can not
participate in Kendo practice because of
religious reasons, asking, for instance, to
take another course of the physical training
instead of Kendo or to submit papers about
Kendo as substituting measures is not
regarded as the activity whose purpose has
religious meaning and whose effect supports,
promotes, and fosters a certain religion, or
oppresses and interferes with other religious
believers or non-believers. To take a
substituting measure in any manner and
condition can not evidently be said to
violate Article 20, paragraph 3. It is not
permitted in public schools to investigate or
look into students' belief, or to treat
religions unequally. However, it does not
violate the requirement of religious
neutrality in public education to investigate
whether a student's refusal of to practice
Kendo is a pretext of indolence or has a
reasonable relation to serious religious
tenet. ^^^
The Supreme Court correctly understood that a
religious student was compelled to either to obey his own
religious teaching and thus be dismissed from the college,
or to participate in Kendo practice and violate his
belief. As Justice Souter and Professor McConnell have
suggested, this is a circumstance in which religious
accommodation is needed, ^^^ though the Japanese Supreme
Court did not say that making people to confront with this
circumstance per se violates the Constitution. The
Supreme Court compared the interest of the College in
requiring its students to practice Kendo with the student
^^^ Id. at 81.
^^^ See supra text accompanying notes 98, 128-129
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interest in not participating in the class, as an exercise
of his constitutional right. The Supreme Court stated
that since Kendo practice was not indispensable for the
purpose of physical training, denying the appellee's
religious right subjected him to an unreasonable
disadvantage.^''^ In so declaring, the Supreme Court held
that the principal of the College would have had to
accommodate the student in this situation.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court said that such an
accommodation did not violate the Constitution under the
"purpose-and-ef fect" test. It is true that, given the
alternative burden, that is, to submit papers, the Supreme
Court permitted the accommodation. As to the alternative
burden, the Supreme Court left it to the principal's
discretion whether or not to take a substituting measure.
This seems to imply that the Supreme Court asked, or at
least recommended the government to take an alternative
burden in a case of accommodation to dilute its benefit to
religion over non-religion. ^^^
^^^ See Tomatsu Hodenori, Shiho Shinsa no Kijun (5):
Shuju no Kenri no Hoshou, 191 Houkaku Kyousitsu 2 6, 27
(1996)
.
^^"^ No Jpanese commentator mentions the relationship
between religious accommodation and the alternative
burden, see e.g., Munesue Yasuyuki, Kendo Jutsugi no
Kyousei to Shinkyou no Jiyuu, 192 Houkaku Kyousitsu 94
(1996)
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C. Analysis.
As we saw, both Germany and Japan have adopted the
religious accommodation approach to some extent. Both
countries permit religious believers to avoid serious
confrontation of their belief with the social order.
Interestingly, the two countries acknowledge that
government can impose alternative burden on the believers
for the price of the accommodation.
The German case^^^ tells us that even if the exemption
of conscientious objectors from military service is
required by the Basic law, government has discretion to
place an alternative burden on the objectors in order to
balance religion with non-religion. It also teach us that
government may make the alternative burden much heavier
than the original burden unless the former burden
suppresses the free exercise of religion.
The Japanese case^^^ indicates that government can use
the alternative burden not only for conscientious
objectors, but also for other religious exemptions. The
Japanese Supreme Court implied that government, or at
least a public college, should seek the possibility to
accommodate a religious student before it implements its
law or policy that imposes a serious burden on him.
^^^ See supra text accompanying notes 214-220
^^^ See supra text accompanying notes 264-271
CHAPTER V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION.
Religious accommodation is used to alleviate
government-imposed burdens on religion. One supposes that
the Free Exercise Clause requires government not to
restrain religious practices. As the United States
Supreme Court stated, government "has not just the right
but the duty to make its own informed judgment on the
meaning and force of the Constitution . "^^^ This means that
government also has authority to interpret the
Constitution though the final word must belong to the
Court. Permissible accommodation may be understood as a
government interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. In
this sense, no reason can be found to draw a line between
an accommodation ordered by courts and that offered by
government. This distinction makes no sense because any
accommodation must be reviewed under the limits of the
Establishment Clause. In other words, all of the
accommodations are required by the Constitution unless
they do not go beyond the limit. ^"^^ Thus, government may
^^"^ City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2171
(1997) .
^'^^ NowAK AND Rotunda, supra note 107, at 1220 ("[T]he
judicial examination of that legislative action will
involve a determination of whether the legislature's
promotion of free exercise values aided religion in a
manner that violated the establishment clause.").
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expressly make an accommodation to religion and courts can
examine whether it violates the Establishment Clause.
As to the principle of reviewing accommodation, the
Justices of the United States Supreme Court seem divided
in two positions: the first follows American history,
tradition, and heritage; the second requires religious
neutrality . ^''^ Neither principle is predominant in the
Court, and both have their shortcoming, as discussed in
Chapter II. The former principle could be unfair to minor
and unpopular religion, while the latter asks government
to offer accommodation to even false claims in the name of
religion. Since it seems impossible to settle on a single
principle to scrutinize the constitutionality of the
accommodation, the Court has to treat the problem on a
case-by-case basis. For instance, the Court may evaluate
accommodation under American history, tradition, and
heritage in a drug consumption exemption case. However, a
case of tax exemption may well be considered under
religious neutrality. It may be better for the Court not
to select only one principle, and to adopt either of them
depending on the character of the accommodation.
Based on this understanding, I want to suggest four
types of religious accommodation. First, government is
permitted to offer a chaplain or a worship place in a
prison, a military base, or a public hospital and nursing
home. Second, government may confer accommodating
benefits on religious groups as well as secular
organizations. A property tax exemption which was upheld
^'^^ See supra text accompanying notes 111-117
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in Walz v. Tax Comm' n^^° falls in this category. Third,
government can exempt, from a generally applicable
requirement, religious believers who claim that the
requirement is an obstacle to their religious practice.
To exempt wearing Jewish headgear from a military uniform
code is this type of accommodation.^®^ Students-initiated
prayer in a public school premise will be permitted in
this category if there is no peer pressure on those who do
not want to participate the prayer. ^^^ Finally, government
can also exempt from the requirement, a religious claim of
certain believers against what the government requires its
people to do. The conscientious objector exemption from
military service or exemption of religious children from
compulsory education falls into this category.
In the fourth category, government has discretion to
impose an alternative burden on the believers for the
price of the accommodation. As we saw in the cases in
Germany and Japan, government may require those who
receive the accommodating benefit to do substituting
service, which does not interfere with their religious
practice. I strongly suggest that government in the
United States should learn those lessons of Germany and
Japan to adopt the alternative burden in order to balance
religion over non-religion and to exclude false claimants
2®° 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) .
^^^ See e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 774 (1988).
^^^ See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992)
("This [peer] pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be
as real as any overt complusion . " )
.
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of religious accommodation.^" One would argue that
because the United States is religiously more complicated
society than Germany and Japan, the examples of the
alternative burden can not be applied easily to America.
My answer is that the alternative burden reduces
disproportion not only between religion and non-religion,
but among religions. Other religious believers will see
that only Amish (Wisconsin v. Yoder) or Jehovah's Witness
(Japanese Kobe City College of Technology Case) can
receive an accommodative exemption. This sort of
frustration would be bigger in a religiously complicated
society. Since the alternative burden may solve this
problem, it will be more useful in a religiously
complicated society.
Since government cannot charge fees for the free
exercise of religion, ^^^ it is impossible to impose the
alternative burden in the other categories. There,
especially in the third category, those who seek the
accommodation engage in their religious practice which has
a priceless meaning in itself. Unlike the freedom of
speech, they do not have any alternative means to express
their beliefs other than the practice. The alternative
burden fits only the case the believers do not want to do
^^^ Some commentators have already suggested the
possibility of the alternative burden on the latter
reason, see supra note 149, 186-189.
^^^ Murdock V. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943)
("Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of
religion are available to all, not merely to those who can
pay their own way.")
.
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what the government requires. The decision on whether the
alternative burden is proportional to the accommodation
belongs to the judiciary. Courts can assure that the
burden is substantially the same as that the believers
want to be exempted from.
Even though countries examined may differ in
attitude, the accommodation to religion seems to be a
common phenomenon in facilitating religious liberty.
Truly, the history of religious persecutions has made
freedom of religion one of the important reason for the
modern constitutional law to secularize government.
However, rigid secularization of state may diminish
religious liberty. There should be a middle ground where
government can accommodate religious liberty while it
remains secular. One can say that giving accommodation
only to religion may lose the balance between religion and
non-religion. To ensure the equality of benefit and
burden in a society, government can take the alternative
burden on religion as the price of the accommodation .'^^^
^^^ See supra text accompanying note 133.
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